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ABSTRACT
The management of explosions in the underground mining environment has been a high priority for managers since the turn
of the century. In the early 1900s explosions, worldwide, reached catastrophic dimensions. In a number of large explosions
more than 1000 people have died.
In the early years of research, the basics of why explosions occurred were investigated and the participation of coal dust
in underground coal mine explosions was proved. Taffanel, a French researcher, was one of the pioneers in establishing the
use of stone dust and was instrumental in the design and development of the first stone-dust barriers. Throughout the century, research on explosions has continued in different parts of the world.
Since explosions still occur in underground coal mines, as recent events in the Ukraine have illustrated, a certain problem
area still exists. This area can be regarded as managerial. This paper gives an overview of the progress made by management in implementing explosion-prevention strategies and presents a new approach to explosion management in terms of an
explosion.management model, based on sound risk management principles. These principles allow the manager to close the
loop in normal explosion management by focusing on all aspects of risk. Including auditing and monitoring to adequately
address and manage the residual risk.
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INTRODUCTION
The possibility of an explosion in a coal mine can never be
completely excluded as the very nature of the material and
the methods employed to extract it always leaves open the
potential for an ignition. With the attention currently given
to the prevention of explosions the probability of one occurring in a mine is very low. However, unfortunately the
probability is significantly higher that when an explosion
does occur, it will cause serious damage. In the event of an
explosion, such as the 1993 Middelbult accident in which
~3 people lost their lives, the risk associated with it and the
Influence/effect on the community are not measurable.
A recent study by Phillips ( 1995) summarized the occurrence of coal mine explosions in South Africa during the
past decade. He listed 11 explosions, which led to 136 fatalities. If these figures were to be coupled with explosions
throughout the world during the same period, it would undoubtedly indicate that although not that frequent in modem
day coal mining, the risk of a catastrophic event is still very
real.

Significant amounts of effort and research worldwide
have been directed at investigating the occurrence, prevention and minimization of the effects of explosions in the
underground coal environment. Indeed, research has been
so extensive that it is doubtful whether anybody could claim
ignorance with regard to the causes or the methods of preventing explosions. Nevertheless, explosions still occur and
do still cause a great loss of life and property.
The question that needs to be answered is why after all
the effort in research and the investment by mines in preventative methods, do these explosions still happen and
what can be done to reduce such incidents even further.Although various models for preventing explosions have
been proposed and used in mines, situations still occur that
lead to the components of an explosion being present.
Whether the explosion is only an insignificant ignition or a
catastrophic event ultimately depends not on the mine's
ability to prevent the ignition, but on the precautions the
mine has taken to either suppress or contain the explosion.
Throughout the Western World these suppression methods and procedures are mostly prescribed by law as are the
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legal safety requirements and the precautions that have to be
taken to prevent ignitions from occurring. This paper addresses those aspects that are not fully prescribed by the law
and that could lead to an increase in the probability of an
ignition or explosion occurring. Attention is given to processes in which the relationships between the causes and the
results are less clear but which are deemed as important if
not of overriding importance in the quest for the complete
elimination of explosions.
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BACKGROUND
Various models for action to prevent explosions from occurring have been proposed. Michelis ( 1991) developed a classic model of explosion-protection controls in coal mining.
These controls are shown in Figure 1 and were presented in
detail by DuPlessis, 1996.
Further models to prevent explosions or ignitions from
occurring have been proposed by other authors. In some
cases these models are based on where the explosion could
occur (in the face or in the goaf area) or, in the majority of
cases, on which methods of prevention are followed.
Notwithstanding whatever model or strategy is followed,
the underlying principle is to prevent an ignition and subsequent explosion by preventing the explosive triangle from
occurring. When an explosion does occur, it is prevented
from reaching significant or catastrophic proportions
through the use of either suppression or containment methods. The final aspect of safeguarding workers is to establish
methods that could assist them in the aftermath of an explosion.
Latterly there has been a tendency to promote a safe
working environment through the use of risk assessment
and management techniques. Risk assessment as part of
mining practice is prescribed by the South African Mine
Health and Safety Act, 1991, and regulations.
In South Africa a certain process of hazard control is
customarily followed. The normal process entails a working group setting up guidelines. A typical relevant example
is the guidelines for explosion prevention drawn up in 1997.
It then becomes the responsibility of the various mining
houses to devise a code of practice according to the guidelines set. Once completed, this is submitted to the Department of Minerals and Energy (DME) for approval. Once
approved, these codes of practice, and the standards flowing
from them, can be enforced as if they were part of the
regulations themselves. Enforcement of compliance with
these standards is the responsibility of the DME.
Although this process has merit, the successful control
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F1gure 1. Exploszon protectwn controls.
of explosion risk is not always ensured as management feels
it has fulfilled its obligations once the code of practice has
been completed. It is as if once the risk has been assessed
and processes to cope with it has been formulated, the risk
is under control. This may be due to the relatively short
period over which risk assessment is done in the mining
process because in reality success is achieved only through
continued risk control and hazard management.
For the control of explosions to be successful, a revised
and expanded explosion-management process is therefore
proposed. This is considered necessary as the process presently used to develop a code of practice centre entirely on
controls and the so-called "hard aspects". In practice, failures are more often ascribable to the "softer aspects", i.e.
the influence of human error on the process. The interaction between the human aspect and the physical control
measures must be taken into account in the development of
an explosion-prevention strategy and the control processes
that are established. In order to accommodate some of these
more fuzzy aspects, additional processes are proposed.
EXPLOSION MANAGEMENT PROCESS
The classic risk management process follows a certain sequence:
)

Identification of the potential hazards, the scope of the
control measures and the shortcomings
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)
)
)

Evaluation of the risk and the effectiveness of the controls
Implementation of measures to manage the residual risk
Measurement and auditing of the residual risk.

This can best be illustrated in a diagram.
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Figure 2. Risk management process.

Controlling the risk is not the only process involved in
risk assessment but it requires the discipline of adhering to ,
the required implementation and maintenance of the control
measures identified through the risk assessment.
Even when these engineering controls have been implemented and successfully used there is still a residual risk of
a methane explosion occurring. In previous work done at
Miningtek by Oberholzer and de Kock (Personal communications, 1998) it was found that in many cases the occurrence of a hazard was mainly due to the inability of the installed system to cope with changes in the environment. For
example, the installed systems could not stop the mining
process in the event of such an increase in methane inflow
that the normal ventilation could not cope with it.
In formulating a solution, an addition to the normal process of risk assessment was proposed. Based on the theory
that an increase in the rate of changes in the environment
would lead to a commensurate increase in the risk of a hazard occurring, a process of "Check For Changes" was proposed.
In this process use was to be made of inputs from not
only the section but also the external physical environment.
Any change taking place at an increased rate would be a
flag to indicate the potential for a hazard occurring. If the
increase in the rate of change was so great that the operation
of the section was to be stopped, the workers withdrawn and
an investigation started, that would prove that the risks involved were still under control or would indicate which
actions had to be taken to rectify the dangerous situation.

387

As this process lends itself to the science of neural networks, work was initiated to allow the information to be
gathered telemetrically and adjudicated by means of a neural net on a computer linked to the mine's communication
system.
These developments unfortunately only addressed the
ambit of engineering controls in terms of their classic definition. Using the components of control, standard setting,
measuring, quantification of the deviation, defming the
cause of the variation and fmally implementation of the
rectifying step, as a basis, it is possible to develop regulated
processes. When the risk of an explosion is simplified by
using the principle of a fixed consequence, then all attention
can be spent on reducing the probability of occurrence. In
preventing the occurrence of an explosion, the consequence
that is guarded against is confmed simply to that of an ignition occurring. As an ignition can only occur when all the
components of the fiery triangle are present, the risk assessment management processes and engineering controls
are focused purely on preventing the occurrence of the three
components.
Attention is then given to ensuring that no fuel in the
form of methane is present through the design and control
of the ventilation system. The second aspect to which attention is directed is to prevent sufficient forms of energy being present to form the initiating heat needed for the ignition. This can take many forms but will usually involve aspects such as flame-proofmg, cutters, rotational speeds, wet
cutter heads, etc. The control of these aspects is relatively
simple as precise measurement criteria for compliance can
be developed.
There are, however, shortcomings in using such a strategy as it does not cater for things not going according to
plan and an ignition occurring. To cater for this eventuality,
the risk to workers and the mine investment is reduced by
installing further engineering controls that reduce or suppress the effects of ignitions. By maintaining the required
amount of stone dust in the working, the effects of a methane explosion can be contained or the controls can even be
expanded by using on-board suppression systems that will
contain the explosion purely to the front of the machine that
extracts the coal. These measures can easily be controlled,
as there are well-defmed standards according to which they
should be applied.
Even though these methods and the standards required
for safe operation are widely known and legislated, accidents still occur. After investigating the causes of these accidents in an environment in which all the safety rules are
supposed to be known and implemented, the researchers
became aware of the increased importance of the softer and
less defmed aspects of the risk management process.
The whole process can be illustrated by examining the
constant monitoring of methane on a continuous heading
machine. Such monitoring is regarded as critical in ensur-
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ing that there is not sufficient fuel present if a machine
should cut into stone and cause a frictional ignition.
It is common practice in South Africa and throughout
the world for continuous heading machines to be equipped
with a continuous methane monitor. This equipment is designed to give an alarm signal at a preset concentration of
between 0.7% and 1% CH4 per volume and is linked to the
cutter motor to trip the machine out at 1.4% CH4• However,
the mere fact that this control is on the machine, and that
standards for its maintenance and calibration have been
drawn up will not reduce the risk of an ignition.
Recently (Du Plessis, 1997) two methane explosions occurred in headings after the monitoring device had been
disconnected because the machine kept tripping out, thereby
impeding production by the machine. These were not isolated incidents, but occur throughout the mining world
where there are production pressures. From this example it
is evident that there is a flaw in many of the presently used
risk assessment and management processes. Even though
aspects like auditing, monitoring and proper training of the
prescribed processes are attended to, there is still no assurance that the controls are being implemented or that the risk
is within acceptable limits. The example further indicates
that the mere presence of a resource does not mean that it is
being applied in the correct manner.
The failure of any of the installed systems to cope adequately with controlling the explosion hazard can be ascribed to two main reasons; the failure of the engineer-ing
system to cope with the impending hazard; or the failure of
the human part of the system to cope with the impending
hazard. Both of the above fall within the ambit of management so that it could be stated that explosions occur due to a
failure of the management system. It can, however, be further argued that if the process or system had been audited
and the shortcomings identified, the necessity for remedial
actions such as training or even further engineering controls
would have been pinpointed. From the essential questions
that need to be answered during an auditing process, like:
Are the current controls practical, known to be adequate,
acceptable, enforced, understood, effective, available, accessible, approved and used?, management would have
been able to address these shortcomings.
It can be safely assumed that there is no mine manager
who would not try his utmost, within the resources under
his control to completely stop explosions from occurring. In
an effort to understand the reasons why management systems established by well-motivated and responsible people
still fail, Oberholzer (1998) developed a model that could be
used to evaluate a higher level of risk which would also
encompasses managerial action.
To allow visualization and for ease of explanation, the
model is represented by a beam with a weight on each side of
a fulcrum, thereby forming a balance of moments. The beam
itself has no weight. When the internal system copes with the

impacts of the environment, the beam is in a state of
equilibrium (balance) as presented in Figure 3.
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Figure 3. Representatzon ofmodel m equzilbnum.
The weight on the working environment side of the beam
represents the requirements of the environment from the
system.
The position of this weight on the beam represents the
way that the requirements are presented to the system. J.be
weight on the opposite side of the beam represents the coping
capacity of this system which is determined by the sum of all
the resources required to cope with the environmental
requirements. The capacity will be made up of the following
resources:
- Fit-for-purpose equipment
- Competently trained staff
- Adequate or suitable policies and procedures.
The position of the weight on the system side of the beam
represents the way the resources are deployed.
The
deployment is indicative of how the resources are managed
with the focus more on the effectiveness than on the amount
of effort expended.
Both sides of the beam represent the internal environment,
including resources and requirements. The impacts on this
environment arise from outside this balanced system.
How the beam will respond to disturbances from the
external environment depends on the way the weights are
positioned and on their size. If the weights are close to the
centre, the beam becomes less stable, whereas if the distances
at which the weights are positioned are increased, an increase
in stability is achieved. The larger the weights, the large·r the
impact required to start moving the beam as a result· of its
internal inertia. The inertia can also be increased by
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extending the distances outward without increasing the size of
the weights.
Some practical considerations had to be incorporated into
the model to make its working represent reality more closely.
It can safely be assumed that no organization will expend and
deploy more resources than are required by the environment
at a specific point in time. Even if a situation has excess
capacity, it will only be used when the system requires it.
This requires the model to have a built-in constraint that will
stop it from becoming unbalanced due to the presence of
over-capacity. The model was therefore expanded to include
this built-in constraint, as shown in Figure 4.
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Figure 4. Adapted model with built in constraint.

Due to this constraint, the excess capacity will cause an
unbalanced situation and will have to be brought into action
before it can have an effect. Spare or excess capacity resources are thus not a safety margin, unless the processes to
bring them into speedy or almost immediate effect exist. On
the other hand, negative deployment actions or the lack of
sufficient capacity will cause the beam to become unbalanced.
Negative actions, no matter how small, can cause a state
of disequilibrium, while a positive deployment could mean
that the system can cope with larger environmental requirements, without incurring the additional costs that accompany
increased capacity.

USING THE MODEL FOR SOLUTIONS
The purpose of the model is not only to create greater
understanding but also to enable more focused and effective
solutions to be formulated.
Using the outcome from risk identification and assessment
processes, the underlying causes and the manner in which
they influence the various components of the overall system

389

can be determined. Applying the model now allows the
drawing up of risk management plans that address the
underlying problems and causes.
To stop a balanced beam from collapsing after an impact,
use can be made of mechanisms that brake or dampen the
initial movement, thereby giving the system time to rectify the
inbalance. By installing an arresting mechanism, the beam is
allowed to go marginally out of balance but is then stopped
from going further. Using this principle, methods can be
devised to allow the mine time to bring spare capacity into
play in the event of an impact.
This method is presently being used as the basis for
developing the Explosive Risk Index measurement system.
Based on the "Check for Changes" method where the rate of
change indicates the risk, the system measures various insection and external parameters. By using neural network
technology, an overall risk is calculated. In the work
currently being conducted, the probability of a methane
ignition occurring is determined. If this probability exceeds a
certain limit then an emergency situation declared all work in
the section is stopped and the workers are withdrawn.
This is done without considering the causes or reasons.
Only when the rates of change have stabilized may work
recommence and is an investigation into the causes initiated.
Although this system is presently focused on the more
visible and dramatic occurrence of underground explosions, it
is anticipated that once the system is functioning
satisfactorily, it could be expanded to encompass the Iess
visible aspects of worker health, like dust, heat and noise
exposure.
In combating the effects of preventable impacts that are
caused by management actions, the solutions are as yet not so
evident. One possible method is to create an increased
resistance to negative changes through management
deployment. This is an area that is fully in the ambit of the
managerial sciences that will have to be relied on to provide
solutions.
Another possible method is to increase the deployment of
the capacity, thereby creating excess capacity.
The
empowerment of workers, increased awareness and training
in the right aspects should be beneficial.
The whole area of capacity deployment appears, however,
to be the one that is the least understood, yet it is this area that
can make the greatest contribution.

CONCLUSIONS
Th~

process of managing the risk of underground explosions, even though it is familiar, is not as simple as it is generally believed to be. Apart from the engineering controls,
aspects like the human factor and management influence
play a significant role.
At present, there are very few processes that incorporate
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the human role or the management role into the risk assessment and management process.
Apart from a fundamentally well-designed engineering
control process, there should also be methods for auditing
implementation and using the controls. As the probability of
a hazard occurring is directly proportional to the period of
time that the control system cannot cope, auditing systems
should also encompass changing conditions, trends and
rates.
These auditing processes should become an integral part
of the overall risk management system. The necessary actions indicated by changes in the system should be implemented both in terms of the resources that are allocated and
the way in which these resources are applied. This means
that risk management is a dynamic process and not simply a
set of guidelines or a checklist for solving risk-related issues. As knowledge is gained, and newer and better methods and technologies are developed for use as engineering
controls, so the process must be reviewed and adapted by
management in order to remain relevant and effective.
The best practices in the world cannot alone eliminate
the explosion risk since the occurrence of an explosion is
ultimately determined by how man has influenced his environment. Man, being both the strong and the weak link in
the chain of occurrences, ultimately controls the safety of
his environment. A process of management that reduces the
negative influence of man, supports and advances his positive contributions and at the same time provides increased
effectiveness of the preventative controls, should be the
ultimate aim of a.risk management strategy.
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